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The Slow Death of the Reasonable Steps Requirement for the Mistake of Age Defence
Isabel Grant*
forthcoming (2021) Manitoba Law Journal
This article examines the demise of the “all reasonable steps” requirement in s. 150.1(4) of the
Criminal Code which limits an accused’s ability to assert a mistaken belief in age as a defence to
sexual offences against children where he has failed to take such steps. The article demonstrates
that the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R v Carbone has rendered this requirement meaningless in
Ontario. Even where the Crown has met its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused did not take “all reasonable steps” to ascertain age, the Crown must still go on and prove
mens rea as to the fact that the complainant was under the age of consent. The article argues that,
where there is no suggestion that a legislative provision is unconstitutional, courts should not use
statutory interpretation to effectively read a legislative provision out of existence, especially where
it was intended to protect children from sexual contact with adults.

I – Introduction
II – The Mistake of Age Defence
III – The Impact of R v Morrison
IV – The Decision in R v Carbone
A.
Background
B.
The “All Reasonable Steps” Issue
C.
Analysis
D. Extending Carbone to Mistaken Beliefs in Consent
V – Conclusion

I.

Introduction

Adolescents face sexual violence at alarming rates in Canada. In 2012, 55% of
complainants in police-reported sexual offences were under the age of 17 even though this group
represented only 20% of the population.1 As the Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged in

*Professor, Peter A. Allard School of Law, University of British Columbia. The author would like to thank Kelsey
Wong, Deborah Trotchine, and Katrin Iacono for their diligent research assistance on this paper and Janine Benedet
and Elizabeth Sheehy for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. This research was supported by a grant from the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council.
1
See Statistics Canada, Police-Reported Sexual Offences Against Children and Youth in Canada, 2012, by
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the sentencing context, the intersecting vulnerabilities of being young and female result in girls
bearing a disproportionate burden of sexual violence against children.2 The Court went out of its
way to describe the particular risks (and stereotypes) facing adolescent girls3 and to highlight the
degree to which the legislative regime enacted to deal with these offences is focused on “the
personal autonomy, bodily integrity, sexual integrity, dignity, and equality of children.”4
But progress in sentencing is meaningless if judges consistently erect new barriers to
effective prosecution of child sexual offences. This article addresses the latest such barrier imposed
by the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R v Carbone.5 In Carbone, the Court held that the
requirement in the Criminal Code that an accused take “all reasonable steps” to ascertain the
complainant’s age before he can raise a defence that he mistakenly believed the child was at or
above the age of consent (generally 16 in Canada) will no longer have any impact on the verdict
in Ontario. Even where the Crown successfully proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused
did not take “all reasonable steps”, it must go on to prove that the accused knew the complainant
was under the age of consent, or was wilfully blind or reckless with respect to that fact.
This article begins with a brief introduction to the mistake of age defence in Canada and
the ways in which courts have slowly chipped away at its effectiveness. It then moves on to provide
a brief review of the problematic decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Morrison6 to set

Adam Cotter & Pascale Beaupré, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 28 May 2014) at 6. In 2016,
50% of all female complainants in police-reported sexual offences were under the age of 17, with the majority
(34%) being between the ages of 12 to 17 years-old. That same year, 73% of all male complainants in policereported sexual offences were under the age of 17, with 42% being under the age of 12 and 30% being adolescents.
See Statistics Canada, Victims of Police-Reported Violent Crime in Canada: National, Provincial and Territorial
Fact Sheets, 2016, by Mary Allen & Kylie McCarthy, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 30 May
2018) at 7.
2
See R v Friesen, 2020 SCC 9 at para 68.
3
See ibid at para 136.
4
Ibid at para 51.
5
2020 ONCA 394 [Carbone].
6
2019 SCC 15 [Morrison (SCC)].
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up the more detailed analysis of the decision in Carbone, the final death knell for reasonable steps
regarding age in Ontario. The article argues that the Court of Appeal for Ontario had a choice to
make in Carbone and chose the path that fully undermined the “all reasonable steps” requirement.
Sexual assault is gendered across all ages and especially so in adolescence. 7 One study
found that under the age of 11, girls experience sexual violence at a rate almost triple that of boys;
for girls between the ages of 12 and 17, that rate jumps to nine times higher than boys.8 Indigenous
girls,9 girls with disabilities,10 and girls in state care11 are particularly vulnerable to sexual violence.
Furthermore, sexual assault against boys peaks at a younger age than for girls. Specifically, sexual
abuse against boys peaks under the age of 12,12 whereas for girls sexual abuse peaks around the
age of 14, 13 just the age where a mistake of age defence might be more plausible.

7

For example, from 2009 to 2014, 87% of all police-reported sexual assaults were committed against females and
98% of perpetrators charged were male. See Statistics Canada, Police-Reported Sexual Assaults in Canada, 2009 to
2014: A Statistical Profile, by Cristine Rotenberg, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 3 October
2017) at 19. This overrepresentation is also seen in adolescents. See Cotter & Beaupré, supra note 1 at 10 (which
found that the rate of sexual assault peaks around the age of 14).
8
See Statistics Canada, Police-Reported Violence Against Girls and Young Women in Canada, 2017, by Shana
Conroy, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 17 December 2018) at 6.
9
See British Columbia, Representative for Children and Youth, Too Many Victims: Sexualized Violence in the Lives
of Children and Youth in Care (report) (Victoria: Representative for Children and Youth, October 2016) at 1. This
report concluded that Indigenous girls in care were more likely to experience sexual abuse than other girls and that
the same was not true for Indigenous boys. See also Statistics Canada, Victimization of Aboriginal People in
Canada, 2014, by Jillian Boyce, Catalogue No 85-002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 28 June 2016) at 10.
10
See Statistics Canada, Violent Victimization of Women with Disabilities, 2014, by Adam Cotter, Catalogue No 85002-X (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 15 May 2018) at 9:
Women with a disability at the time of the survey were more likely to have experienced
sexual abuse at the hands of an adult before they reached 15 years of age (Chart 4). One
in five (18%) women with a disability were touched in a sexual way by an adult before
the age of 15, a proportion that was double that of women without a disability (9%).
Likewise, 12% of women with a disability reported being forced into unwanted sexual
activity by an adult before the age of 15, compared with 5% of women without a
disability.
11
See Isabel Grant & Janine Benedet, “The ‘Statutory Rape’ Myth: A Case Law Study of Sexual Assaults Against
Adolescent Girls” (2019) 31:2 CJWL 266 at 280–81.
12
See Cotter & Beaupré, supra note 1 at 10 (which found that in 2012 “[t]he peak age at which boys were victims of
sexual offences was 8”). 73% of all male complainants in police-reported sexual offences in 2016 were under the
age of 17, with the largest group, 42%, being under the age of 12. See Allen & McCarthy, supra note 1 at 7.
13
See Cotter & Beaupré, supra note 1 at 11: “[f]or girls, the rates of sexual offences generally increased with age
before peaking at age 14”.
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In fact, this gendered dynamic is clearly reproduced in the mistake of age case law. I
examined 20 years of reported case law (between 2000 and 2020) across Canada on mistake of
age defences, including all cases where there was an actual child complainant.14 This review
revealed 117 reported cases involving the defence. More than 96% of cases involved male
perpetrators, with only four cases involving female perpetrators.15 Similarly, 107 cases involved
girls as complainants (91%), and 10 cases involved boys (9%), including one case where the 15year-old complainant was “in the process of transitioning to becoming a male” and identified as
male.16 The gendered stereotypes underlying this defence are most evident in cases involving

14

I excluded five cases involving Internet luring involving a police sting operation and thus no actual child victim. I
also excluded cases where no outcome on the defence was reached.
15
See R v George, 2017 SCC 38 [George (SCC)]; R v Johnson, [2001] NJ No 276, 52 WCB (2d) 456 [Johnson]; R v
Otokiti, 2017 ONSC 5940 [Otokiti]; R v Akumu, 2017 BCSC 527 [Akumu].
16
R v WG, 2018 ONSC 5404 at para 5. The complainant was described as identifying as a male at the time of the
sexual offences. The defence was unsuccessful in this case on the basis that the accused had not taken all reasonable
steps to ascertain the complainant’s age. The other cases involving boys are: George (SCC), supra note 15; Johnson,
supra note 15; R v TSH, 2008 ABPC 281 [TSH]; R c Lévesque, 2011 QCCS 7093; R v Angel, 2019 BCCA 449
[Angel]; R v Thompson, 2017 NBCA 62; R v Sohail, 2018 ONCJ 566; R v Crant, 2018 ONSC 1479 [Crant]; R v
LFM, 2015 BCPC 449 [LFM].
For all of the cases involving female complainants, see: Otokiti, supra note 15; Akumu, supra note 15; Carbone,
supra note 5; R v Normand, 2014 ONSC 3861 [Normand]; R v Crosdale, 2018 ONCJ 800; R v Jat, 2019 SKQB 51;
R v Hope, 2011 NLTD(G) 143 [Hope]; R v John, 2020 ONSC 3790 [John]; R v ET, 2010 ONSC 3913 (CanLII)
[ET]; LSJPA – 1731, 2017 QCCQ 15023; R v Abdulkadir, 2018 ABPC 244; R v A(D), 2011 ONCJ 130; R v CGJ,
2018 BCPC 216; R v Ayer, [2008] OJ No 3611, 2008 CanLII 46922; R c Bourelle Vanasse, 2020 QCCQ 2315; R v
PDB, 2000 SJ No 348; R v Purchase, 2011 ABQB 643; R v NW, [2005] MH No 108, 4 WWR 304; R v Dunchie,
2007 ONCA 887; R v Nakogee, 2017 ONSC 4885; R v Moazami, 2014 BCSC 1727; R v RKD, 2012 ABPC 205; R v
Poirier, 2011 ABPC 350 [Poirier]; R v Singh et al, 2020 MBCA 61; R v HL, 2017 ONSC 6205; R v Saliba, 2019
ONCA 22; R v Kim, 2004 BCCA 57 [Kim]; R v Gonzales, 2011 BCPC 353; R v Skunk, 2010 ONCJ 209; R v DRD,
2020 ABPC 46; R v Konneh, 2019 ABQB 3; R v Silavi, 2019 BCCA 366; R v Duran, 2013 ONCA 343 [Duran]; R v
Coburn, 2019 NSPC 49 [Coburn]; R v Wrigley, 2018 NWTSC 67 [Wrigley]; R v Chapais, 2017 ONSC 120
[Chapais]; R v MB, 2017 ONSC 4163; R v Ryder, 2011 BCSC 133; R v Beckford, 2016 ONSC 1066; R v Hubert,
2016 BCPC 288; R v Holloway, 2013 ONCA 374 [Holloway]; R v Arook, 2016 ABQB 528; R v Ekendia, 2011
NWTTC 17; R v Audet, 2020 ONSC 5039; R v Azonwanna, 2020 ONSC 1513; R v Hudon, 2010 OJ No 6023; R v
Merrlles, 2016 SKCA 128; R v Gashikanyi, 2015 ABCA 1; R v Piche, 2018 ABQB 980; R v Lefthand, 2019 ABPC
127 [Lefthand]; R v UHC, 2015 NSPC 10; R v DO, 2017 ONSC 2027 [DO]; R v E, 2011 NUCJ 35 [R v E]; R v
Quinones, 2012 BCCA 94; R v (R), 2014 ONCJ 96 [R v (R)]; R v Mabior, 2010 MBCA 93; R v MGB, 2005 ABPC
215; R v JM, [2017] NJ No 223, 2017 NLTD(G) 110; R v Budden, 2014 NJ No 78; R v Young, [2010] NJ No 264,
2010 CarswellNfld 421; R v Ross, 2012 NSCA 56; R v Hussein, 2017 ONSC 2584; R v GL, 2014 ONSC 3403; R v
Dragos, 2012 ONCA 538 [Dragos]; LSJPA – 1728, 2017 QCCQ 13555; R v Tannas, 2015 SKCA 61 [Tannas]; R v
Eichner, 2020 ONSC 4602; R v Ford, 2017 ABQB 542; R v Dichrow, 2020 ABPC 58; R c Vasiloff, 2017 QCCQ
15612 [Vasiloff]; R c Perreault, 2019 QCCQ 6097; R v Sims, 2006 BCSC 651; R v JTC, 2013 NSPC 88; R v TQBN,
2016 SKQB 10 [TQBN]; R v Nguyen, 2017 SKCA 30 [Nguyen]; R v Alfred, 2020 BCCA 256 [Alfred]; R v MacLean,
2018 NLSC 209; R v May, 2017 ONCJ 167; R v Craig, 2013 BCSC 1562; R v Gale, 2012 BCPC 456; R v MC,
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successful defences. There were only three reported cases involving boys where the defence was
successful, and none involving complainants who were identified in the decision as transgender or
nonbinary.17 By contrast, there were 34 cases involving girls where the defence was successful
and three additional cases where an appellate court overturned a conviction on the basis of errors
regarding the defence. While these reported cases probably represent only a fraction of the actual
cases involving the defence during this time period, it is notable that the gender breakdown is
remarkably similar to statistics on sexual violence generally.
This article argues that while Carbone applies to all children under the age of consent, it
will have its greatest impact on the most marginalized girls. This argument is not meant to trivialize
sexual violence against boys or those who identify as gender nonbinary; both groups face
significant harm from sexual violence committed overwhelmingly by men,18 and further study is

[2011] NJ No 228, 95 WCB (2d) 543; R v Garraway, 2010 ONCJ 642; R v Mangat, 2018 ABCA 309; R v Slater,
2005 SKCA 87; R v Chapman, 2016 ONCA 310 [Chapman]; R v Saliba, 2013 ONCA 661 [Saliba (2013)]; R v CJJ,
2020 BCPC 2; R v Cummer, 2014 MBQB 62; R v CJC, 2018 NLCA 68; R v KS, 2018 ONSC 1988; R v CIL, 2019
ABPC 64; R v Martinez, 2020 ONCJ 303; R v CGV, 2017 ONCJ 850; R c Héon, 2019 QCCQ 5609; R v Minzen,
2017 ONCJ 127 [Minzen]; R v Akinsuyi, 2016 ONSC 2103; R v Hall, 2018 ABQB 459; R v Powell, 2016 ONSC
562; R v Clarke, 2016 SKCA 80; R v Beaulieu, 2016 ONCJ 280; R v Moise, 2016 SKCA 133; R v Hoffart, 2010
ABPC 122; R v D(AJ), 2016 NSPC 74; R v Ambrus, 2014 ABPC 173; R v Mastel, 2011 SKCA 16; R c Naud, 2018
QCCQ 4480; R v Lewis, 2015 SKQB 291 [Lewis].
17
See George (SCC), supra note 15; TSH, supra note 16; LFM, supra note 16. The success rate for the defence was
slightly higher among girl complainants, but with the small number of cases involving boys it is impossible to draw
any conclusions from this finding.
18
Between 2009 and 2014, boys accounted for 50% of male victims of police-reported sexual assaults. See
Rotenberg, supra note 7 at 13–14. In 2012, perpetrators of sexual assault against boys were overwhelmingly male,
with only 2% of cases involving a female accused and a male victim. See Cotter & Beaupré, supra note 1 at 14. A
Canadian study conducted by the Department of Justice reported that childhood sexual abuse can have “profound
effects on a man’s identity and sexual activity”: Susan McDonald & Adamira Tijerino, “Male Survivors of Sexual
Abuse and Assault: Their Experiences” (2013) at 7, online (pdf): Department of Justice <www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rppr/cj-jp/victim/rr13_8/rr13_8.pdf> [perma.cc/K2UJ-GJGJ]. See also Marie Choquet et al, “Self-Reported Health and
Behavioral Problems Among Adolescent Victims of Rape in France: Results of a Cross-Sectional Survey” (1997)
21:9 Child Abuse & Neglect 823 at 831. A more recent American study found that boys who had experienced
childhood sexual abuse were more than twice as likely as boys who had not experienced sexual abuse to have
attempted suicide. See Shanta R Dube et al, “Long-Term Consequences of Childhood Sexual Abuse by Gender of
Victim” (2005) 28:5 Am J Prev Med 430 at 433. There is also evidence to suggest that children who identify as
transgender or nonbinary face a high rate of sexual violence. See Karen Rosenberg, “Higher Prevalence of Sexual
Assault Among Transgender and Nonbinary Adolescent Students” (2019) 119:8 American J Nursing 49. See also
Andrea L Roberts et al, “Childhood Gender Nonconformity: A Risk Indicator for Childhood Abuse and
Posttraumatic Stress in Youth” (2012) 129:3 Pediatrics 410 at 414.
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warranted to identify the stereotypes that can undermine judicial decision making around these
child victims. However, the cases under study predominantly involve male violence against girls
and, as will be discussed below, the stereotypes invoked to support successful defences of mistaken
belief in age are also uniquely gendered. These stereotypes sexualize girls and portray them as
older and thus as sexually available to men.

II.

The Mistake of Age Defence

In 1987, Parliament revised its structure of sexual offences against children and enacted a
number of new offences such as sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching.19 In these
prosecutions, age is substituted for non-consent; once the Crown proves the young age of the
complainant, it need not prove non-consent in order to obtain a conviction.20 Prior to this new
regime, a defence that an accused was mistaken about the complainant’s age was expressly
prohibited by the Criminal Code.21 The 1987 reforms included a new limited defence of mistaken
belief in age in s. 150.1(4) to respond to criticisms that the previous offence was effectively one
of absolute liability and thus risked being invalidated under s. 7 of the Charter.22
The mistaken belief in age defence enacted in s. 150.1(4) allows an accused to raise a
mistaken belief that the complainant was at or above the age of consent, but the defence will only
be successful where the accused has taken “all reasonable steps” to ascertain the complainant’s

19

See An Act to Amend the Criminal Code and the Canada Evidence Act, SC 1987, c 24; Criminal Code, RSC 1985,
c C-46, ss 151, 152 [Code].
20
See Code, supra note 19, s 150.1(1).
21
See Criminal Code, RSC 1970, c C-34, s 146 (1).
22
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s7, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. See e.g. R v Hess, [1990] 2 SCR 906, 59 CCC (3d) 161; Reference Re BC Motor
Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 SCR 486, 24 DLR (4th) 536.
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age. This provision was modelled on the reasonable steps provision for consent for sexual offences
against adults,23 but there were some crucial differences. First, the reasonable steps provision
dealing with consent in the context of adult complainants only requires the accused to take
reasonable steps and not all reasonable steps. Second, the reasonable steps provision dealing with
consent only requires the accused to take reasonable steps “in the circumstances known to the
accused at the time”.24 Parliament clearly made the decision that a more stringent standard was
warranted for child victims of sexual offences.
The purpose of the “all reasonable steps” requirement was to prevent adults from asserting
that they were mistaken about the complainant’s age where they had failed to do everything
reasonably possible to avoid having sex with a child. The common law had allowed men to rely
on mistaken beliefs in consent that were unreasonable so long as they were honestly held – which
was precisely why Parliament enacted reasonable steps provisions.25 Section 150.1(4), like other
reasonable steps provisions, modifies that common law position.
There are a number of reasonable steps provisions with respect to age in the Criminal Code
that have been enacted since 1987, most of which require the accused to take “all reasonable steps”
while others simply require “reasonable steps”.26 In 2008, Parliament raised the age of consent for
most sexual offences against children from 14 years of age to 16, but the age may be as high as 18
for certain offences27 and as low as 12 where the accused is close in age to the complainant.28 A

23

See Code, supra note 19, s 273.2(b).
Ibid.
25
See Pappajohn v The Queen, [1980] 2 SCR 120 at 156, 111 DLR (3d) 1. See also An Act to Amend the Criminal
Code (Sexual Assault), SC 1992, c 38.
26
See e.g. Code, supra note 19, ss 150.1(4), (5), (6), 163.1(5) (requiring “all reasonable steps”), and ss 171.1(4),
172.1(4), 172.2(4) (requiring only “reasonable steps”).
27
See ibid, ss 153(2) (sexual exploitation), 163.1(1) (child pornography). Obtaining sexual services for
consideration is subject to a higher penalty where sexual services are obtained from someone below the age of 18.
See ibid, s 286.1(2).
28
See ibid, s 150.1(2).
24
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large majority of the reported decisions involve adolescent girl complainants between the ages of
12 and 15, but there are at least five reported cases since 2000 involving girls as young as 11,29
and one luring and child pornography case involving a 9-year-old girl where mistaken belief in
age was raised.30
Courts have consistently interpreted reasonable steps provisions regarding age and consent
as putting no burden of proof on the accused.31 Rather, once the accused raises an air of reality that
he was mistaken and that he had taken “all reasonable steps” to ascertain age, the burden of proof
remains on the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did not take all
reasonable steps.32 Once the Crown has met that stringent burden, the accused is precluded from
arguing that he had a mistaken belief.33 In other words, the reasonable steps requirement puts a
limit on when an accused could raise the defence of mistaken belief in age. The decision of the

29

See Hope, supra note 16; Lefthand, supra note 16; Normand, supra note 16; John, supra note 16; ET, supra note
16. The youngest male complainants in cases involving the mistaken belief in age defence in this time period were
both 13 years of age. See Crant, supra note 16; TSH, supra note 16. The law is unclear as to whether an accused can
argue mistaken belief to bring a complainant within the close in age exceptions rather than the age of consent. For
example, can an 18-year-old male argue he mistakenly believed he was having sex with a 15-year-old (to bring him
within the close in age exceptions) when in fact the complainant was 12? See Isabel Grant & Janine Benedet,
“Confronting the Sexual Assault of Teenage Girls: The Mistake of Age Defence in Canadian Sexual Assault Law”
(2019) 97:1 Can Bar Rev 1 at 14–15 [Grant & Benedet, “Mistake of Age”].
30
See Otokiti, supra note 15, where the female accused argued mistaken belief in age about a nine-year-old girl who
was lured online..
31
See e.g. R v Westman, [1995] BCJ No 2124 at para 20, 28 WCB (2d) 440 (CA) [Westman]; R v Osborne (1992),
102 Nfld & PEIR 194 at paras 44–47, 17 WCB (2d) 581 (CA) [Osborne].
32
There was some lack of clarity as to whether the air of reality threshold applied only to the mistaken belief or
whether it applied to having taken reasonable steps as well. It was settled in R c Gagnon, 2018 CMAC 1 at para 28,
aff’d 2018 SCC 41 [Gagnon (CMAC)] that it applies to both. It is noteworthy that the accused must point to an air
of reality for many defences, including some that go to mens rea, such as the intoxication defence. See R v Cinous,
2002 SCC 29 at para 57.
33
See e.g. R v Morrison, 2017 ONCA 582 at para 95 [Morrison (CA)]; R v Levigne, 2010 SCC 25 at para 36
[Levigne]. Justice Abella, who would have struck down the reasonable steps test in Morrison (SCC), supra note 6,
agreed with the interpretation of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that once the Crown has met its burden of
disproving reasonable steps beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused is precluded from raising the defence of
mistaken belief in age. See Morrison (SCC), supra note 6 at para 207. See also Hamish Stewart, “Fault and
‘Reasonable Steps’: The Troubling Implications of Morrison and Barton” (2019) 24:3 Can Crim L Rev 379 at 381
(describing a reasonable steps provision as providing “an alternative route by which the Crown can prove the fault
element of the offence”).
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Supreme Court in Morrison, which was extended further in Carbone, has now brought this case
law into question.
Isabel Grant and Janine Benedet have demonstrated the degree to which courts have
gradually whittled away at the reasonable steps requirement.34 First, the requirement that an
accused take “all” reasonable steps has been effectively read out of s. 150.1(4), such that provisions
requiring “all reasonable steps” are applied in the same way as those requiring only “reasonable
steps”.35 Second, courts have read into s. 150.1(4) the requirement from the provision dealing with
consent that an accused must only take reasonable steps in the circumstances that are known to
him at the time,36 despite the fact that Parliament clearly made a decision not to limit reasonable
steps regarding age in this way. Third, as Grant and Benedet have demonstrated, some courts have
held that the surrounding circumstances may require the accused to do absolutely nothing in order
to satisfy having taken “all reasonable steps”.37 Sometimes, how the complainant looks or behaves
is sufficient to obviate the need to take any steps at all, let alone “all reasonable steps”.38 These
cases sometimes involve men whose mistakes are based on stereotyped beliefs about the sexual
availability of girls who look or behave in certain ways rather than on actual knowledge of the
complainant’s age. A finding that these men have to do nothing to ascertain age legitimizes these
stereotypes and acquits men on the basis of them. Together these developments in statutory
interpretation have undermined Parliament’s clear language and its intent to protect child victims
from sexual activity with adults. All of this has been done without resort to the Charter. Thus, the

See generally Grant & Benedet, “Mistake of Age”, supra note 29.
See Angel, supra note 16 at para 46.
36
See e.g. Morrison (SCC), supra note 6 at para 105; R v Thain, 2009 ONCA 223 at para 37 [Thain]; Dragos, supra
note 16 at paras 35–41; R v Ghotra, 2016 ONSC 1324 at paras 153–54; R v Pengelley, 2010 ONSC 5488 at paras 8–
17 [Pengelley]; R v E, supra note 16 at paras 32, 96–97; Tannas, supra note 16 at paras 22, 25, 28.
37
See Grant & Benedet, “Mistake of Age”, supra note 29 at 23–31.
38
See e.g. Tannas, supra note 16 at paras 27, 34–35; R v LTP, [1997] BCJ No 24 at para 20, 33 WCB (2d) 292 [R v
LTP]; R v Mastel, 2010 SKPC 66 at paras 28–30 [Mastel (SKPC)].
34
35
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“all reasonable steps” requirement in s. 150.1(4) had already been substantially weakened by the
time of Carbone.
There is one final point worth making about the mistake of age defence. The mistake of
age defence is only relevant where the complainant has agreed to participate in sexual activity with
the accused. If the complainant did not agree to participate in sexual activity, it does not matter
what belief the accused had about her age – that is sexual assault. However, in many of the reported
cases, the complainant testified that such agreement was not given, and the accused testified that
the complainant did agree to engage in sexual activity and that he thought she was above the age
of consent. In 44 of the 117 reported cases (38%) involving a defence of mistaken belief, the
complainant testified to a lack of agreement to participate in sex.39 In more than one-third of the
cases in which the defence of mistaken belief was ultimately successful, the complainant testified
that no such agreement was present.40 The mistake of age defence thus has the potential to shift
the judicial narrative in these cases. It no longer becomes a question of has the Crown proven that
the child did not agree to participate in sexual activity but rather, assuming she agreed to participate
in sex, has the Crown negated that the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain age. The
complainant’s allegations of non-consent may disappear from the case entirely.41
Before turning to the details of Carbone, it is necessary to briefly review the decision in
Morrison – a 2019 decision of the Supreme Court of Canada which created the potential to further
undermine reasonable steps provisions. Without Morrison, a decision scholars and courts have

39

This figure was slightly higher in cases involving female complainants (38%) than in cases involving male
complainants (30%).
40
This was the case in 14 of the 37 cases in which the defence was successful, 12 involving girls as complainants
and two involving boys.
41
See e.g. Holloway, supra note 16 at paras 12–14 (discussing the trial judge’s failure to adequately consider
whether there had been “consent” on the part of the complainant). The Court noted, at para 15, that “[a] finding that
the sexual conduct was not ‘forced’ was not enough to determine whether, apart from the question of the
complainant’s age, there was a potentially operative consent.”
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struggled to interpret, this issue would not have been considered in Carbone after years of clarity
about how reasonable steps provisions operate.42
III.

The Impact of R v Morrison

At issue in Morrison were the evidentiary presumption and the reasonable steps provision
associated with the crime of Internet luring of children in s. 172.1(3) and (4) of the Criminal Code,
respectively. Internet luring in s. 172.1(1) is an unusual crime because it can be committed in two
distinct ways, both defined by the same subsection of the Criminal Code. An accused can be
convicted for luring an actual child online or for luring someone the accused believes to be a child,
which usually arises in the context of an undercover police officer pretending to be a child.
Morrison itself involved a police sting operation in which the 67-year-old accused was charged
with luring an undercover police officer who was holding herself out as a 14-year-old girl. The
luring jurisprudence lacked clarity on the fact that the Criminal Code set out different elements for
the two different ways in which the crime could be committed.43 Where the accused lures someone
who is falsely holding herself out to be a child, the legislation requires that the accused “believe”
he is communicating with a child. No such requirement of belief is set out in the legislation where
the accused is luring an actual child, and principles of statutory interpretation would normally
allow recklessness as sufficient mens rea in this situation.44

See e.g. Isabel Grant & Janine Benedet, “Unreasonable Steps: Trying to Make Sense of R v Morrison” (2019) 67
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The reasonable steps provision in s. 172.1(4), the wording of which mirrors other
reasonable steps provisions, does not acknowledge that this crime can be committed in different
ways. There are differences between a man who asserts he wrongly believed he was talking to an
adult (when he was in fact talking to a child), and a man who asserts he believed he was talking to
an adult, and was in fact doing so, albeit an adult who was pretending to be a child. In the latter
scenario, the provision is effectively requiring the accused to take reasonable steps to confirm that
he is in fact talking to an adult before he can say he disbelieved a representation that he was
engaging with a child. The mandatory evidentiary presumption in s. 172.1(3) complicated this
analysis by presuming, where the person represented themselves as a child, that the accused
believed he was talking to a child. In other words, in virtually every case involving an undercover
officer, the accused was deemed to believe that he was communicating with a child unless he could
raise evidence to the contrary, even though he was in fact communicating with an adult. In some
cases, that evidence to the contrary was an accused arguing that he was role-playing, or that he
believed he was talking to an adult who was pretending to be a child, for the purposes of sexual
gratification.45 The luring provisions were added to the Criminal Code in 2002,46 and it appears
that no thought was given to how the reasonable steps provision would actually work where the
accused correctly believed he was talking to an adult.
The Supreme Court in Morrison was unanimous in striking down the evidentiary burden
as contrary to s. 11(d) of the Charter and not saved by s. 1. The dissenting judgment of Justice
Abella would have also struck down the reasonable steps provision under s. 7 of the Charter.
However, Justice Abella was clear on how reasonable steps provisions work generally and on the
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fact that once the Crown had negated reasonable steps beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused
cannot assert an honest but mistaken belief. Justice Abella would have invalidated the provision
as violating an accused’s right to full answer and defence because, in her view, it is almost
impossible to ascertain identity on the Internet, let alone age, given the anonymous nature of online
communications and the potential for deception. Further, according to Justice Abella, an accused
who takes steps to ascertain age by, for example, asking the complainant for a photograph enhances
his risk of being charged with luring because those very steps could be evidence of luring.47 The
approach of Justice Abella failed to recognize that talking to children online is only criminalized
under s. 172.1 where it is done for the purpose of facilitating the commission of (almost always) a
further sexual offence.48 Merely talking to a child online about sex, where the accused has no
purpose to facilitate a further offence, is not criminalized as Internet luring under s. 172.1. A man
who is unable to ascertain the age of the person with whom he is speaking can simply desist from
pursuing any further sexual purpose until he has a more meaningful opportunity to ascertain age.49
It is the judgment of Justice Moldaver for the majority that has led to considerable problems
for other reasonable steps provisions. The majority avoided striking down the reasonable steps
provision in s. 172.1(4) by effectively interpreting it out of existence for the crime of Internet
luring. The majority held that, even where the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that
the accused had not taken reasonable steps, the Crown would still have to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused believed he was talking to a child.50 This reasoning was largely
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driven by the requirement in s. 172.1(1) that, where the accused was not talking to an actual child,
he must have believed he was talking to a child.
The majority repeatedly limited its analysis to the sting operation context where the
accused’s belief is an element of the offence.51 It did so precisely because, in the police sting
context, there is no actual child being harmed and the accused’s moral blameworthiness lies in his
belief that he is talking to a child.52 For other sexual offences against actual children, recklessness
is sufficient mens rea.53 The sting context is unique because without a belief that he is talking to a
child, the accused has done nothing wrong, at least if one assumes there is nothing wrong in roleplaying the sexual abuse of children.54
Morrison rendered the reasonable steps provision for Internet luring meaningless. Grant
and Benedet have argued that the decision leaves no room for the reasonable steps requirement to
have any impact on the verdict:
If the trier of fact does not have a reasonable doubt that the accused believed the
complainant was underage, he will be convicted. If the trier of fact has a reasonable
doubt about the accused’s belief, the accused is acquitted even though he did not
take reasonable steps. Reasonable steps are irrelevant to the verdict, which depends
entirely on whether the Crown can prove the accused believed he was talking to an
underage child.55
The Morrison majority went out of its way to limit its judgment to Internet luring in the
context of a police sting operation. The Court of Appeal for Ontario, therefore, had a choice in
Carbone about whether to accept the majority at its word that Morrison was limited to the sting
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context or to undermine the “all reasonable steps” requirement in other Criminal Code provisions
dealing with mistakes about age. It is to the decision in Carbone that this article now turns.
IV.

The Decision in R v Carbone

A. Background
The accused in Carbone was convicted at trial of invitation to sexual touching. The
evidence presented by the Crown was that three 14-year-old girls reached out to the accused on
Facebook asking him if he would give them tattoos in exchange for sex. They negotiated that one
of the girls would give him “a blow job” before he did the tattooing and another would have
intercourse with him after he finished the tattoos.56 The complainant, HJ, testified that soon after
she arrived at the accused’s home, she went upstairs with Carbone, performed oral sex on him, and
then each of the girls was given a tattoo. HJ testified that when she was performing oral sex, she
saw that the accused had a tattoo on his penis. While the accused did spend some time alone with
HJ’s friend KM afterwards, KM refused to testify and thus there was no evidence about what
happened after the tattooing. Later that evening, HJ received a Facebook message from someone
she assumed to be the accused saying, “H. that was amazing. Best I ever had. Gold medal.”57 HJ
also testified that the accused did not ask her how old she was, nor whether she had permission
from her parents to get a tattoo. Another girl, AG, confirmed much of HJ’s testimony and added
that HJ had told the accused the true ages of the girls, although that was not part of HJ’s testimony.
The 31-year-old accused also testified. He operated a licensed tattoo parlour out of his
home where he lived with his fiancée.58 He testified that the girls had approached him to exchange
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sex for tattoos, but that he had told them each tattoo would cost $35 and that he had staunchly
rejected their offers.59 He testified that he was never alone with any of the girls and that his fiancée
came home after he had tattooed the first two girls, a fact which the girls denied. When he
demanded money from the girls, they told him their mother would come by later and pay him.
When the mother did not appear, the accused testified that he called HJ and told her that if she did
not pay him, he would contact her parents and go to the police.60 He testified that HJ assured him
that she would pay him by Friday. On Friday morning, the police arrived at Carbone’s home and
arrested him. He testified that he initially thought he was being arrested for tattooing underage
girls.61 While the girls testified that he did not ask their age, he testified that they told him on
Facebook they were 16 and that he had seen a permission slip signed by somebody he assumed to
be a parent, although he could not produce it.62 He admitted that he did think it was strange that
three girls the same age would have the same mother, but he did not ask any questions about this.63
He testified that he was not able to produce any of the Facebook messages “because his fiancée
had destroyed them after he was arrested.”64
After his fiancée testified to corroborate his account, the defence recalled the accused at
which point he mentioned for the first time that he had told the girls that he had a tattoo “on his
‘crotch’” because one of the girls was worried the tattoo was going to hurt. He said he wanted to
reassure her that where she was getting tattooed would be less painful than the one on his crotch
had been.65
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The trial judge convicted the accused. The judge believed beyond a reasonable doubt that
the accused had agreed to give the complainant a tattoo in exchange for oral sex, that the
complainant had performed oral sex on him, and that the accused had not taken the requisite “all
reasonable steps” to assert a defence of mistaken belief in age.66
The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial primarily on the basis that the trial judge had made
a number of errors regarding burden of proof. The trial judge stated that he was “not convinced”
by the accused’s testimony that a financial arrangement was made for the tattoos;67 “not
persuaded” that the Facebook message received by HJ after the events was not sent by the
accused;68 “not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt” that the accused saw a permission slip;69 and
“not persuaded” by the fiancée’s testimony that he had not negotiated to exchange tattoos for sex.70
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that the occasional mistake on burden of proof has to be seen
in the context of the correct instructions earlier in the judge’s reasons, but decided that it had to
allow the appeal because the facts to which these mistakes related were central to the accused’s
defence and contrary to the requirements of R v W(D)71 regarding burden of proof and credibility.
The Court of Appeal could have left the matter there and allowed a new trial on burden of proof
errors alone, but it decided to go on and clarify the impact of Morrison on the reasonable steps
provision in s.150.1(4).72
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B. The “All Reasonable Steps” Issue
The trial judge in Carbone, prior to the decision in Morrison, convicted the accused
because the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had not taken all
reasonable steps to inquire into the complainant’s age as was the law at that time. This has been
the approach taken by appellate courts across the country for years,73 and the Supreme Court of
Canada had confirmed this approach in R v George.74 Once Morrison was released, however, the
defence in Carbone argued on appeal for the first time that the reasoning in Morrison should be
extended to invitation to sexual touching such that, even where the Crown has proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused failed to take “all reasonable steps” to ascertain the age of the
complainant, the Crown must go on to prove that the accused knew or was wilfully blind to the
complainant’s young age.
The Court of Appeal agreed with the Crown that the context of Internet luring could be
distinguished from invitation to sexual touching. The statutory provisions dealing with Internet
luring must be able to address the unique challenges of dealing with those who use the Internet to
exploit children and to facilitate police intervention before further sexual offences have taken
place. The luring legislation allows police to intervene not only based on an underage complainant
but also based on the accused’s belief about the complainant’s age, thus allowing for sting
operations to identify predators before they lure actual children. Because there is no harm to an
actual child in the sting context, a “stringent subjective standard” of mens rea is required.75 The
mistake of age defence and the corresponding “all reasonable steps” provision for sexual offences
against actual children require a less stringent mens rea requirement. The Court of Appeal did
73
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acknowledge that the reasonable steps provision has no role left to play in the context of Internet
luring,76 but it explicitly held that this analysis could not be extended to reasonable steps provisions
for other offences against actual children.
However, the Court of Appeal accomplished exactly the same result by returning to the
Morrison majority’s brief discussion of the decision in George and concluding that the Crown now
has a new additional mens rea requirement before an accused can be convicted. The unanimous
Supreme Court of Canada judgment in George77 had confirmed that the reasonable steps
requirement modifies the mens rea requirement for the crime of sexual interference. In other
words, an honest belief that the complainant was above the age of consent is only a defence where
the accused has taken all reasonable steps. Once the Crown disproves beyond a reasonable doubt
that the accused took all reasonable steps, there is no room for an accused to assert an honest
mistaken belief in age.
Ms. George was acquitted of sexual interference at trial on the basis that a trial judge had
a reasonable doubt that she had taken “all reasonable steps” to ascertain age before having sex
with an underage male friend of her son.78 The Court of Appeal overturned that acquittal on the
basis that information the accused gained while having sex with the complainant could not
constitute reasonable steps and that the trial judge had drawn improper inferences about the
appearance of the complainant.79 The Supreme Court of Canada reinstated the acquittal on the
basis that the Court of Appeal should not have interfered with the trial judge’s assessment of the
evidence. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the widely held understanding of
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the reasonable steps provisions requiring the Crown either to negate the mistaken belief or to
negate the all reasonable steps requirement:
[T]o convict an accused person who demonstrates an “air of reality” to the
mistake of age defence, the Crown must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt,
either that the accused person (1) did not honestly believe the complainant
was at least 16 (the subjective element ); or (2) did not take “all reasonable
steps” to ascertain the complainant’s age (the objective element) [...]. 80
[and]
It is a criminal offence to sexually touch a child who is 14 years of age or
more but younger than 16 when you are five or more years their senior,
even if you honestly believe they are older than 16, unless you have taken
“all reasonable steps” to ascertain their age; nothing more is required
[...].81
George is unequivocal on how the “all reasonable steps” provision limits the defence of
mistaken belief. However, there were two paragraphs about George in Morrison – which were
completely unnecessary for a decision on Internet luring in the sting context – that bring this
finding in George into doubt. The majority in Morrison effectively rewrote George by saying that
even where the Crown has disproven all reasonable steps to ascertain age beyond a reasonable
doubt, a conviction is not inevitable because the Crown would still have to prove George knew the
complainant’s age. Here is that confusing passage from Morrison in full:
Given that the complainant was legally incapable of consenting,
Ms. George’s sole defence was that she believed, albeit mistakenly, that
the 14-year-old complainant was at least 16 years old. In those
circumstances, if the trier of fact were to find or have a reasonable doubt
that Ms. George honestly believed the complainant was at least 16, she
would be entitled to an acquittal. Put differently, if the Crown hoped to
obtain a conviction, it had to overcome her defence of mistaken belief.
Against this backdrop, the passage in question at para. 8
of George explains that there were two alternate ways by which the Crown
could negate the defence of mistaken belief in age once the air of reality
test had been met. First, the Crown could prove that the accused did not
80
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honestly believe the complainant was at least 16; or, second, the Crown
could prove that the accused did not take “all reasonable steps” to ascertain
the complainant’s age. While the Crown had to prove at least one of these
propositions to negate the defence of mistaken belief, doing so would not,
from a legal perspective, inevitably lead to a conviction. As a legal matter,
to obtain a conviction for sexual interference or sexual assault of a person
under the age of 16, the Crown had to go further and prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused believed the complainant was under 16.
As a practical matter, once Ms. George’s sole defence was negated, her
conviction was a virtual certainty.82

With the emphasized part of this passage, the Morrison majority risked undermining all
of the Criminal Code’s reasonable steps provisions regarding age. It did not indicate that it was
overruling the unanimous decision in George or even that George had misstated the law. Ought
we to take this passage as the Morrison majority implicitly undoing years of appellate
jurisprudence, including its own clear language in George, on reasonable steps provisions in the
context of mistaken beliefs in age? This is precisely what the Court of Appeal for Ontario
concluded in Carbone, holding that the Crown disproving all reasonable steps is no longer
sufficient to negate a mistaken belief in age defence:
As I read the above-quoted passage, it is no longer, strictly speaking, correct to
define the required mens rea with respect to the complainant’s age by reference,
only to the absence of reasonable steps to determine the complainant’s age. There
is a mens rea requirement that focuses exclusively on the accused’s state of mind.
The Crown is required to prove the accused believe the complainant was underage.
The requisite proof is not provided by the Crown’s negation of the defence created
by s. 150.1(4).83

Unlike the passage quoted from Morrison which speaks only of actual belief, the Court in
Carbone did concede that recklessness about the complainant’s age will be a sufficient mental
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state under these offences. But the fact remains that the requirement that the accused take “all
reasonable steps” has no impact on the verdict. If the accused raises an air of reality that he was
mistaken about the complainant’s age and that he took all reasonable steps, the Crown must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not take all reasonable steps, but doing so does not result in
conviction. The Crown must go on and prove a subjective fault requirement beyond a reasonable
doubt. Rather than a path to conviction, the reasonable steps provision is transformed into one
more hurdle for the Crown. If the Crown is unable to disprove reasonable steps beyond a
reasonable doubt, the accused is acquitted. If the Crown is able to disprove reasonable steps beyond
a reasonable doubt, the inquiry moves on to did the accused know, or was he willfully blind or
reckless as to the age of the complainant before obtaining a conviction.
The Court of Appeal did recognize that it had opened the door to acquittals for those who
never bother to think about age but go ahead and engage in sexual activity with a child regardless.
What follows looks a bit like a new description of recklessness, referred to as “reckless
indifference”, to deal with those who simply do not think about age. The Court described reckless
indifference as follows:
An accused who never turns his mind to the complainant’s age can properly be
described as reckless with respect to the complainant’s age in most circumstances.
Indifference to the age of the person targeted by sexual activity is a choice by an
accused to treat the complainant’s age as irrelevant to his decision to engage in the
sexual activity. In most circumstances, the age of the young person will have
obvious relevance, bearing in mind the clear responsibility which the law places
upon adults who choose to engage in sexual activity with young persons: […]
Reckless indifference describes a subjective state of mind. It reflects a choice to
treat age as irrelevant and to assume the risk associated with that choice. While this
may describe a relatively low level of recklessness, there is nothing in the nature of
the conduct engaged in which would warrant any level of risk taking or preclude
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the imposition of criminal liability based on a reckless indifference to the
complainant’s age: […]84

However, even this definition of “reckless indifference” requires a choice to treat age as
irrelevant and a subjective awareness of the risk. The person who simply does not think about age
is not reckless. The Court also acknowledged that usually the failure to take reasonable steps will
make it difficult for the accused to claim that he believed the complainant was of the required age.
There will be “few situations in which a person who engages in sexual activity with an underaged
person and does not take reasonable steps to determine the age of that person, will not be found to
have been at least reckless as to the true age of the complainant.”85 The Court acknowledged that
it had complicated the job of trial judges and juries for these crimes. It set out the following steps
to follow. If these instructions appear complicated, imagine explaining steps two and three to a
jury:
Step 1: The trial judge will first determine whether there is an air of reality to the s.
150.1(4) defence, that is, is there a basis in the evidence to support the claim the
accused believed the complainant was the required age and took all reasonable steps
to determine the complainant’s age.
Step 2: If the answer to step 1 is no, the s. 150.1(4) defence is not in play, and any
claim the accused believed the complainant was the required age is removed from
the evidentiary mix. If the answer at step 1 is yes, the trial judge will decide whether
the Crown has negated the defence by proving beyond a reasonable doubt, either
that the accused did not believe the complainant was the required age, or did not
take all reasonable steps to determine her age. If the Crown fails to negate the
defence, the accused will be acquitted. If the Crown negates the defence, the judge
will go on to step 3.
Step 3: The trial judge will consider, having determined there is no basis for the
claim the accused believed the complainant was the required age, whether the
Crown has proved the accused believed (or was wilfully blind) the complainant was
underage, or was reckless as to her underage status. If the answer is yes, the trial
judge will convict. If the answer is no, the trial judge will acquit. 86
84
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The first step is clear and relates to the judge’s role in determining whether the defence has
met the air of reality threshold to point to some evidence that the accused was mistaken about the
complainant’s age and that he took all reasonable steps to ascertain it. The second step addresses
whether the Crown is able to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt either the mistaken belief or the
“all reasonable steps”. Where things get complicated is step 3. Even if the Crown proves beyond
a reasonable doubt either that the accused was not mistaken or that he did not take all reasonable
steps to ascertain age, the Crown in Ontario now has an additional burden to prove that the accused
knew that the complainant was under the age of consent or was wilfully blind or reckless with
respect to that fact. There is no mention of “reckless indifference” in this third step, thus suggesting
that it is simply synonymous with recklessness and that the Court was not attempting to develop
some new modified form of recklessness.
The Court was explicit that it is the two paragraphs from Morrison about George,
unnecessary for the decision in Morrison, that have undermined constitutionally valid criminal
legislation:
The treatment of George by the majority in Morrison makes it clear that the Crown
cannot prove the requisite mens rea for offences set out in s. 150.1(4) by disproving
the defence created by that section. To convict, the Crown must prove the accused
had the requisite state of mind with respect to the complainant’s underage status.87
Again, the Court reiterated that there will be “few situations”88 where the accused will be able to
raise such a reasonable doubt about his knowledge/recklessness that the girl was underage.

While one can imagine circumstances in which the failure to advert to the age of
the complainant should not be characterized as a decision to treat the age of the
complainant as irrelevant and take the risk, those circumstances will seldom occur
87
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in the real world. For practical purposes, those rare circumstances, in which the
failure to turn one’s mind to the age of the complainant does not reflect the decision
to take a risk about the complainant’s age, will be the same rare circumstances in
which the reasonable steps inquiry in s. 150.1(4) will be satisfied even though the
accused took no active steps to determine the complainant’s age.89
As will be discussed in more detail below, the Court acknowledged in this passage that,
unsurprisingly, the cases where this new additional mens rea requirement will be most likely to
lead to acquittal will be those where courts have already done the most to undermine the “all
reasonable steps” requirement in the past, holding that the accused need do nothing to satisfy taking
“all reasonable steps”.90 In other words, acquittals will be most likely the accused has made
assumptions about a child’s age based on what she looks like, how she behaves, or the
circumstances in which he finds her without having done anything to ascertain age.
(C) Analysis
Carbone effectively renders the “all reasonable steps” provision in s. 150.1(4) irrelevant to
whether an accused is convicted in Ontario. Instead, it makes the “all reasonable steps”
requirement an additional hurdle for the Crown to negate to avoid an acquittal, even though doing
so will not lead to conviction. An accused can no longer be convicted on the basis that he failed to
take all reasonable steps to ascertain the age of the complainant. Instead, for the accused who did
nothing to ascertain a child’s age, the Crown must prove at least recklessness with respect to the
fact that the complainant was underage.
While the approach in Carbone could be said to logically flow from the obscure passage
about George in Morrison, it was not the only possible interpretation. The Court of Appeal for
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British Columbia took a different path in Angel91 when it declined to apply Morrison to the crime
of sexual interference against an actual child. The Court in Angel correctly highlighted the fact that
the majority in Morrison limited its judgment to the context of a police sting operation where an
actual belief about age is required by the legislation. Sexual interference, by contrast, always
involves an actual child, and knowledge is not required:
In the context of a police sting operation where there is no child who is under the
legal age, as in Morrison, the offence depends on the accused’s belief that he is
communicating with an underage person. In contrast, the offence[sexual
interference] in s. 151 does not engage the accused’s belief as to the complainant’s
age as an element of the offence in the absence of the mistake of age defence being
raised.92

The Court in Angel differentiated Morrison as follows. The problem in Morrison was that
the elements of the defence of mistake did not line up with the elements of the crime of Internet
luring. The defence was founded on the Crown negating an objective test, whereas the offence
explicitly required an actual belief. Therefore, disproving the defence was not sufficient to prove
the offence. In sexual interference, by contrast, recklessness is sufficient and therefore disproving
the defence will inevitably lead to conviction.93 However, most importantly, the Court in Angel
acknowledged that the all reasonable steps requirement “imports an objective element”94 into the
recklessness analysis for sexual interference. Thus, while the Court of Appeal is equating the “all
reasonable steps” test with recklessness, it is recklessness modified by an objective component
that is mandated by the all reasonable steps requirement in s. 150.1(4):
The judge was required to consider the all reasonable steps requirement to
determine the availability of the defence. By doing so in this context, he was also
assessing whether the Crown had satisfied its burden of proving the requisite mens
91
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rea of the offence—i.e., that the appellant’s subjective belief was not objectively
reasonable, and was therefore reckless. Therefore, once the trial judge concluded
that the appellant had failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain the
complainant’s age, there was no need to explicitly revisit the essential elements of
the offence. At that point, the judge was satisfied that the Crown had met its burden
of proving that the mistake of age defence did not apply. At the same time, the
culpable fault element for sexual interference was established: the appellant
intended to touch the complainant for a sexual purpose and was recklessly
indifferent as to his age.95

This approach makes more sense where one reads in the requirement that the accused must only
take steps in the circumstances known to the accused at the time, which the Court in Angel appears
to do, because that adds the necessary subjectivity into the test.96
The Court in Angel made explicit that it was concerned about the possibility of extending
Morrison beyond the narrow context of the sting operation because it had the potential to
undermine decades of sexual assault law reform enacted to prevent acquittals based on
unreasonable mistaken beliefs:
More precise reasoning by the Supreme Court of Canada than exists in Morrison is
required before it can be extended to the interrelationship of the mens rea
requirement and mistake of age defence, as they pertain specifically to the offence
of sexual interference under s. 151 of the Code. This is particularly the case where,
as noted above, Moldaver J. restricted his analysis to the context of Internet luring
where there is no actual underage child […]97
Thus, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia managed to maintain a meaningful role for s.
150.1(4). Once the Crown proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was not mistaken or
did not take all reasonable steps, conviction will follow.
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While Angel is cited for the principle that recklessness is sufficient mens rea for sexual
interference,98 there is no mention in Carbone of the different approach to reasonable steps in
Angel. The objective component mandated by s. 150.1(4) disappears from the analysis. The
Supreme Court of Canada has denied leave to appeal in Angel,99 and it is unlikely the Crown will
seek leave to appeal in Carbone.100 Regardless, the result is that we are left with an “all
reasonable steps” requirement for age in British Columbia but not in Ontario.
The Court of Appeal for Ontario purported to limit its decision by imposing a minimalist
interpretation of recklessness, stating that it will often be enough to show that the accused did
nothing to ascertain age. But the fact remains that someone who never considers the possibility
that he is dealing with a child is entitled to an acquittal. Recklessness is a subjective mental state
and an honest belief, however unreasonable, that the complainant is older than 16 is inconsistent
with a finding of recklessness unless one reads in the objective component as acknowledged by
the Court of Appeal for British Columbia in Angel.101 Recklessness requires a subjective awareness
of the risk; wilful blindness requires an actual suspicion that such is the case and the deliberate
closing of one’s mind to the possibility because one does not want to know.102 The Supreme Court
of Canada in R v Zora103 has confirmed that recklessness is a subjective standard requiring the
accused “[perceive] a substantial and unjustified risk”.104 Further, despite its efforts, the Court of
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Appeal cannot bind future trial judges on findings of fact. A trial judge who finds that the accused
never thought about age would be correct in rejecting a finding of recklessness.
Parliament has decided that the failure to take “all reasonable steps” to find out how old a
child is before engaging in sexual activity is a blameworthy mental state. If one reads in “in the
circumstances known to the accused” as the courts have done, this mental state has a clear
subjective component, but it also has an objective component mandated by s. 150.1(4) requiring
that all steps that are reasonable be taken. This approach differs from the traditional common law
understanding of recklessness as to age because it allows for a conviction where an accused has
done nothing to inform himself about the complainant’s age, based on his knowledge of the
circumstances, or where he has not taken all the steps considered reasonable. Parliament is free to
depart from the common law and has done so in s. 150.1(4). Again, no court has found this level
of fault to be unconstitutional.105

The Court in Carbone suggested that the only cases where this new mens rea requirement
will make a difference are those where courts have already held that the accused need not take any
steps in order to satisfy having taken “all reasonable steps.”106 These cases involve courts
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disregarding clear Parliamentary language to instead rely on stereotyped beliefs about the sexual
availability of the most marginalized girls.107 Not thinking, or making assumptions about a girl’s
age based on the size of her breasts;108 her associating with older people;109 her jogging110or
hitchhiking at night;111 the fact she knew how to perform oral sex112 or her portrayal as the sexual
aggressor;113 or the fact that she was drinking alcohol, taking drugs, or smoking cigarettes,114
should never have satisfied taking “all reasonable steps”. Such stereotypes tell us nothing about a
particular girl’s age. They operate disproportionately against girls who are already marginalized
through their chaotic family lives,115 risk-taking behaviours,116 or previous experience with sex
which may well have been abusive because of their young ages.117 Lacking parental supervision,
abusing drugs or alcohol, knowledge of sex, or even breast development are not reliable indicators
of being at or above the age of consent, nor are they steps to ascertain age. It is notable that
Indigenous girls are disproportionately impacted by sexual assault and by racist stereotypes about
their sexual availability that may feed into an accused making the argument that the circumstances
removed his statutory obligation to take “all reasonable steps” to ascertain age.118

See Grant & Benedet, “Mistake of Age”, supra note 29 at 24. See e.g. Mastel (SKPC), supra note 38 at paras 20–
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[1996] NBJ No 104, 1996 CarswellNB 67; Coburn, supra note 16; Chapais, supra note 16; Minzen, supra note 16;
Wrigley, supra note 16; DO, supra note 16; Vasiloff, supra note 16. It is noteworthy that all of these cases involve
girls as complainants and none of the three cases involving boys as complainants had a similar statement.
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A finding that doing nothing could ever satisfy taking “all reasonable steps” was already a
deliberate distortion of Parliament’s unequivocal language in s. 150.1(4). But it was a distortion
judges could choose to avoid by giving some content to the “all reasonable steps” requirement.
The Crown in Ontario now faces a bigger problem in proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused made a subjective choice to disregard age where he has done nothing to ascertain it. The
Court of Appeal has opened up the likelihood that men who never consider they are having sex
with a child, because they have relied on such stereotypes to inform themselves, will now be
entitled to an acquittal even where they have failed to take any steps to ascertain that child’s age.
An honest belief, even if based on stereotypes, racism, or misogyny, is still an honest belief that
can undermine a finding of recklessness and entitle a man to an acquittal after Carbone, unless the
Crown can prove the more onerous standard of wilful blindness.119 The fact that it will be the most
vulnerable girls who are most directly impacted should concern us all. Our society has deeply
embedded preconceptions about what is a real sexual assault against a teenage girl, particularly for
girls who are mischaracterized as the aggressors in sexual interactions with older men.120
D. Extending Carbone to Mistaken Beliefs in Consent

The reasoning in Carbone could also be relied on by defence counsel to argue that the
reasonable steps requirement in the consent context for cases involving adult complainants should
be undermined in the same way. The Supreme Court of Canada decision in R v Barton121 strongly
supports the assertion that where there is no air of reality to the defence of mistaken belief or where
the Crown has negated reasonable steps, there can be no defence of mistaken belief in
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communicated consent for an accused charged with sexual assault against an adult. The Barton
Court made clear that where no reasonable steps were taken, there is no defence:

Section 273.2(b) imposes a precondition to the defence of honest but mistaken
belief in communicated consent — no reasonable steps, no defence. It has both
objective and subjective dimensions: the accused must take steps that are
objectively reasonable, and the reasonableness of those steps must be assessed in
light of the circumstances known to the accused at the time […]. Notably, however,
s. 273.2(b) does not require the accused to take “all” reasonable steps, unlike the
analogous restriction on the defence of mistaken belief in legal age imposed under
s. 150.1(4) of the Code. […]122

Barton, like Morrison, was written by Justice Moldaver and released barely two months after
Morrison. Yet Barton does not even cite to Morrison let alone adopt its reasoning. Barton should
have settled that Morrison was not intended to limit the reasonable steps requirement in the context
of consent.
However, despite this clear statement in Barton, Justice Bennett, writing for the Court
Martial Appeal Court of Canada in R v MacIntyre,123 relied on Morrison and Barton to undermine
the reasonable steps requirement in the context of consent. At issue in MacIntyre was whether the
Crown had to prove that the accused knew the complainant was not consenting, even where there
was no air of reality to the assertion that he had taken reasonable steps to ground a defence of
mistaken belief. While the Morrison Court had gone out of its way to stress the uniqueness of the

Ibid at para 104 [footnotes omitted; emphasis added]. Barton also endorsed Professor Elizabeth Sheehy’s
statement that the purpose of the reasonable steps provision dealing with consent was to criminalize sexual assault
perpetrators whose mistaken belief in consent is based on “self-serving misogynist beliefs.” See Elizabeth A Sheehy,
“Judges and the Reasonable Steps Requirement: The Judicial Stance on Perpetration Against Unconscious Women”
in Elizabeth Sheehy, ed, Sexual Assault in Canada: Law, Legal Practice and Women’s Activism (Ottawa: University
of Ottawa Press, 2012) 483 at 492. I would argue that the reasonable steps test in the context of age is similarly
intended to prevent men from relying on mistaken beliefs in age that are based on self-serving misogynistic beliefs
about the sexual availability of children and especially girls.
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sting context for Internet luring, Justice Bennett focused on the similarities between sexual assault
against an adult and Internet luring in the police sting context and held that:
The real core of… [Justice Moldaver’s] reasoning was that substituting a defence
for an element of an offence offends the “bedrock principle of criminal law” that
the Crown must prove the essential elements of an offence beyond a reasonable
doubt.124

She went on to hold that the Crown must still prove the mens rea for sexual assault even
where the accused had failed to raise an air of reality about reasonable steps. To justify this step,
Justice Bennett relied largely on statements about the mens rea for sexual assault taken from cases
where mistaken belief in consent was not at issue.125 This decision in MacIntyre came just one
month after Barton, and while it does refer to Barton, it does so selectively without mentioning
the above-cited passage. There is no reference in MacIntyre to R v Gagnon,126 where the Supreme
Court of Canada unanimously upheld a finding by the Court Martial Appeal Court of Canada that
if there is no air of reality to reasonable steps, the defence of mistaken belief in consent cannot go
to the trier of fact.127
The Supreme Court of Canada denied leave to appeal in MacIntyre, and the decision has
not yet been relied on by other appellate courts.128 The clear inconsistency of MacIntyre with the
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unequivocal language in Barton, and its failure to cite relevant Supreme Court authority, should
give other courts pause before following the decision.
V.

Conclusion

The result of Carbone is to undermine, at least in Ontario, an important provision enacted
by Parliament in 1987 as part of a legislative scheme designed to protect children from sexual
contact with adults. The “all reasonable steps” requirement in the context of age plays an important
role in preventing especially adult men from being acquitted for having sex with children where
they failed to take all reasonable steps to ascertain the child’s age.
Courts are empowered to strike down legislation when it violates the Charter. When it does
not, supremacy of Parliament is supposed to mean something; legislation should not be effectively
interpreted out of existence as the courts have done in Morrison for s. 172.1(4) of the Criminal
Code, in Carbone for s. 150.1(4), and in MacIntyre for s. 273.2(b). Courts should instead do their
best to give effect to Parliament’s intent in enacting legislation to protect children from sexual
contact with adults. Parliament has made taking “all reasonable steps” a statutory requirement, and
no court has ever held that requiring an accused to raise an air of reality about such a requirement
is unconstitutional. Instead, it has been interpreted out of existence only to be finally laid to rest in
Ontario by the Court of Appeal in Carbone. 129
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The decision in Carbone came only weeks after the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R v Sullivan, 2020 ONCA 333,
this time relying on s. 7 of the Charter, struck down s. 33.1 of the Criminal Code, enacted explicitly to protect the
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violation of s. 7 in the criminal context leaving women and children with no rights even when criminal laws are
enacted for their protection.
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One can only hope that other provincial appellate courts, and the Supreme Court of Canada,
will follow the approach of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia in Angel which takes the
Morrison Court at its word and allows the “all reasonable steps” provision to have some role in
prosecutions for sexual abuse against children.130 It is not too much to ask that adults be required
to do everything reasonably possible to find out how old a child is before seeking out sexual
activity with that child. Nor is it too much to ask that our courts, where there is no issue of
constitutionality, respect legislative provisions enacted by Parliament to protect children from
sexual violence.
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The Court of Appeal for British Columbia has recently also rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of
substituting young age for non-consent in s. 150.1. See Alfred, supra note 16.
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